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ABSTRACT

Management Earnings Forecast Decisions in a Regulated
Regime: Evidence from China

by

YANG Jingyu

Master of Philosophy

Since 2000, China has required publicly listed firms to issue management earnings
forecasts when they expect extreme changes in earnings or are likely to become
loss-making. This study examines managers’ forecast decisions under this unique
regulatory environment. I find an increase over time in the proportion of firms
issuing voluntary earnings forecasts when they do not expect extreme changes in
their earnings or losses. I also find an improvement in the quality—in terms of the
precision, accuracy and bias—of both mandatory and voluntary forecasts over time.
Further detailed analysis shows that the introduction of the regulation on
management earnings forecasts is one of the underlying forces driving firms’
decisions to provide voluntary earnings forecasts. Specifically, I find that a firm is
more likely to issue a voluntary forecast if the firm was required by regulation to
issue an earnings forecast in the previous year. Peer pressure also explains firms’
decisions to issue voluntary forecasts. I then investigate the reasons underlying the
improvement in the quality of management earnings forecasts. I find that learning
effects and peer pressure are the driving forces behind the improvement. Specifically,
I find that the forecasts issued by more experienced firms are more specific, accurate
and conservative. Furthermore, the quality of a firm’s forecast is positively related to
the quality of its peer firms. Overall, my results show that requiring some listed firms
to issue management earnings forecasts in China might have built up a momentum
that has promoted the issuance of voluntary forecasts and improved the quality of
forecasts over time.
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Management Earnings Forecast Decisions in a Regulated
Regime: Evidence from China
Chapter 1. Introduction

Since 2000, China has required publicly listed firms to issue management earnings
forecasts when they expect extreme changes in earnings or are likely to become
loss-making. Based on management earnings forecast data obtained for 2007-2013, I
find that the quantity of management earnings forecasts in China has increased over
these years, with the number of firms issuing forecasts increasing from 515 to 1,004.
More importantly, I also find an increase over time in the proportion of firms issuing
voluntary forecasts. Specifically, the proportion of voluntary forecasters increased
from 12% in 2007 to 60% in 2013, which is higher than the corresponding proportion
in countries where decisions about forecasts are voluntary (25% obtained from Hamn
et al. 2014). Furthermore, the quality of the management earnings forecasts has also
improved consistently and substantially over time. For example, I find that during
this period the average forecast error level decreased by 99.6% while the average
precision level increased by about 60%.

My study examines the determinants of management forecast decisions in China’s
unique regulatory environment. Specifically, I determine whether the selective
mandatory forecast requirement outlined above leads to the issuing not only of
mandatory earnings forecasts, but also of voluntary earnings forecasts. Furthermore,
I also examine whether the selective mandatory forecast requirement induces peer
and learning effects that result in an improvement in the quality of management
earnings forecasts.
1

I expect that China’s selective mandatory forecasting requirement promotes the
issuing of voluntary earnings forecasts, for two reasons. First, recent theoretical
studies on corporate disclosure policies suggest that firms display intertemporal
stickiness in their disclosure behavior (Einhorn and Ziv, 2008). Specifically, firms
tend to refrain from making voluntary disclosures if they have not made them in the
past. However, the selective mandatory forecast requirement means that publicly
listed firms in China are mandated to issue forecasts from time to time, which tends
to break the stickiness in non-disclosure. As Einhorn and Ziv (2008) argue, once the
firm has made a disclosure, then that firm will face a higher cost of non-disclosure
and/or a lower cost of disclosure. As a result, I expect that firms will be more likely
to issue a voluntary forecast if they have previously been mandated to issue a
forecast.

Second, the existence of the selective mandatory forecast requirement leads to a
significant number of firms being mandated to issue forecasts from time to time.
Recent studies of corporate disclosure suggest that firms may compete to disclose
more firm information to outsiders to signal their quality to investors (Hidalgo
Cabrillana, 2013) or to reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Graham et al., 2005;
Healy and Palepu, 2001). The presence of a large number of forecasters potentially
gives rise to peer effects in which firms are pressured to issue voluntary forecasts to
compete with peer firms. Such peer effects may be stronger when the selective
mandatory forecast requirement also promotes the issuing of voluntary forecasts,
further increasing the number of forecasters in an industry.

I obtain evidence that is consistent with the above predictions. Specifically, I find
2

that firms are more likely to issue a voluntary forecast if they were required to issue
an earnings forecast in the previous year. More importantly, I find a significant
positive association between the proportion of peer firms issuing both mandatory and
voluntary forecasts and the likelihood of a firm issuing a voluntary forecast.

Regarding the determinants of forecast quality, I also expect that peer effects will
have driven the improvement in forecast quality evident in China. To the extent that
firms have to compete not only in providing forecasts but also in producing
good-quality forecasts (Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2013), I expect to find a positive
relationship between a firm’s forecasting quality and the average forecasting quality
of peer firms in the same industry. I also expect that the selective mandatory forecast
requirement will give rise to learning effects, because the selective mandatory
forecast requirement mandates firms to issue earnings forecasts from time to time.
The learning effect will be stronger if the selective mandatory forecast requirement
also encourages firms to issue voluntary forecasts, further increasing the forecasting
experience accumulated by a firm. To the extent that an effective learning effect
exists (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Huber, 1991), I expect the forecasts made by firms
with a longer forecasting experience to be more precise, more accurate and less
biased.

I also obtain evidence that is consistent with the hypotheses above; that is, firms tend
to issue earnings forecasts that are more precise, accurate and conservative if they
have more forecasting experience. Furthermore, the forecasting quality of a firm is
positively correlated with that of its peers. Overall, my results suggest that China’s
selective mandatory forecast requirement may have given rise to an information
3

environment that encourages firms to issue voluntary forecasts and promotes an
improvement in forecast quality over time.

My study makes several contributions to the literature on management earnings
forecasts. First, it contributes to the literature by offering evidence on management
earnings forecast decisions in a regulated environment that has not yet been
investigated by previous research. Previous studies examined management earnings
forecast decisions in which disclosure is either purely voluntary (e.g. Baginski et al.
2002; Ajinkya et al. 2005) or effectively mandated (e.g. Kato et al. 2009; Jelic et al.
1998). China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement integrates elements of both
mandatory and voluntary regimes, as firms are required to issue forecasts under
certain conditions while remaining free to issue forecasts voluntarily under other
conditions. This regulatory regime applies not only to mainland China but also to
other markets such as that of Taiwan. China has the largest emerging market that has
gradually been opened up to foreign investors. Research on this topic will thus be of
great interest to investors.

Second, previous studies identify several factors that may influence management
forecast decisions, such as legal environment, disclosure regulations, the political
economy, corporate governance, product market competition and customer
relationships (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Chin et al., 2006;
Heflin et al., 2012; Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2013; Johnson et al., 2001; Li, 2010;
Radhakrishnan et al., 2012). My study highlights two determinants that are new to
the literature, namely peer effects and learning effects, and demonstrates how these
influence management forecast decisions. My results enhance our understanding of
4

the determinants of management forecast decisions.

Third, in contrast to previous research based on the management earnings forecasts
made by firms in developed countries such as the U.S. (e.g. Karamanou and Vafeas
2005; Ajinkya et al. 2005), Canada (Baginski et al., 2002) and Japan (Kato et al.,
2009), my research is conducted in an emerging market. It is well known that
emerging markets tend to have a more primitive investor protection framework and a
weaker information environment than mature markets (La Porta et al., 2000). How to
regulate corporate disclosure policies in such markets has been intensely debated.
The results of my study should have important policy implications for China and
other emerging markets.

My study also contributes to the literature on financial reporting regulations. First,
my study shows that China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement can serve as a
policy intervention that changes the costs of non-disclosure/disclosure faced by
publicly listed firms and promotes voluntary disclosure. Second, in a recent review
of the literature on financial reporting regulations, Leuz and Wysocki (2015) suggest
that “we generally lack evidence on market-wide effects and externalities from
regulation, yet such evidence is obviously central to the economic justification of
regulation.” My study examines the peer effects and learning effects that have
emerged since the introduction of the selective mandatory disclosure requirement in
China and demonstrates how they influence both the quantity and the quality of
management forecasts. In doing so, my study offers evidence on how this
requirement can generate market-wide spillover effects and long-term effects in a
financial system. Thus, my study can further enhance the understanding of financial
5

reporting regulations.

My study is also related to a working paper by Huang et al. (2014), which also
examines how China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement influences the
issuing and quality of voluntary disclosures. However, my study differs in three
respects. First, I use a different sample period. While Huang et al. (2014) focus on
2004-2011, my study examines management earnings forecasts from 2007 to 2013.
Second, Huang et al. (2014) only examine how the issuing of a mandatory forecast in
the previous year influences the probability of a firm issuing a voluntary forecast in
the current year. I examine an additional determinant, namely the peer effect. Indeed,
my evidence shows that the determinants examined in my study have a stronger
explanatory power regarding the decision to make a voluntary disclosure in China.
Third, Huang et al. (2014) measure forecast quality according to precision and
timeliness, whereas I examine it in terms of precision, error and bias. I focus on peer
effects and learning effects as the determinants of forecast quality, rather than the
forecasting experience in the previous year, as Huang et al. (2014) study.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
institutional setting in China, reviews previous papers and develops testable
predictions. Chapter 3 describes the sample and the data. Chapter 4 examines the
forces underlying voluntary disclosure and Chapter 5 discusses drivers of
improvements in forecast quality. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.

6

Chapter 2. Research Background

2.1. Regulation of Management Earnings Forecasts in China.
Unlike the U.S. stock market, where management earnings forecasts are voluntary,
management earnings forecasts on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
have been semi-mandatory since the end of 2000. Initially, only publicly listed
firms that anticipated making a loss were required to issue management earnings
forecasts. The conditions under which firms are required to issue forecasts have
since been continuously extended and modified, with firms being required to issue
forecasts under a broader range of conditions. In 2001, the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges required listed firms to issue management earnings forecasts not
only if they expected to make a loss, but also if they expected an increase or
decrease in earnings of more than 50%. In 2006, firms were further required to
issue forecasts if they expected to make a profit in a particular year after making a
loss in the previous year. This essentially completed the management earnings
forecast regulations in China. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the development of
the management earnings forecast regulations of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 2000.

[Insert Table 1]

According to the 2006 regulations, all earnings forecasts are classified by issuers
into nine types: slight earnings increase (positive change but less than 50%), slight
earnings decrease (negative change but less than 50%), uncertain, profit making
again (making a profit), loss making again (making a loss), large earnings increase
7

(positive change and more than 50%), large earnings decrease (negative change
and more than 50%), turning loss into profit (making a profit) and loss for the first
time (making a loss). Of these categories, loss making again, large earnings
increase, large earnings decrease, turning loss into profit and loss for the first time
represent the circumstances under which firms have been required to issue
management earnings forecasts since 2007.

2.2. Literature Review.
In this section, I review the relevant literature on management earnings forecast
decisions and explain how my study contributes to the literature. My study is
directly related to the literature on the determinants of management earnings
forecasts. Previous studies suggest that many factors, such as the legal environment,
disclosure regulations, board composition, ownership structure, managerial
incentives and market competition, affect the management earnings forecast
decisions of firms. Of these factors, research on the effects of disclosure
regulations on management earnings forecast decisions is particularly relevant to
my study. Using a sample of high-tech firms, Johnson et al. (2001) study the effects
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), enacted in 1995 by the
U.S. Congress to reduce frivolous securities class actions related to the voluntary
disclosure of forward-looking information. They find that the PSLRA reduces the
litigation risk faced by firms and thereby increases the incentive of managers to
release forward-looking information. They also show that the PSLRA does not
have a negative effect on the quality of forward-looking information. Subsequently,
in 2000, the SEC passed the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits
firms from disclosing information to selected analysts without simultaneously
8

providing the same earnings guidance to the public. Several studies, including
those of Heflin et al. (2003), Bailey et al. (2003) and Ajinkya et al. (2005), find that
Reg FD increases voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Kothari et al. (2009) find that
Reg FD constrains managers’ incentives to withhold bad news. However, the study
conducted by Wang (2007) suggests that disclosure decisions taken after the
implementation of Reg FD depend on firm’ characteristics. Firms reduce their
earnings guidance if they have lower information asymmetry and higher propriety
information costs. Heflin et al. (2012) investigate the effect of Reg FD on the
properties of management earnings forecasts. They find that Reg FD reduces
optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts and thereby increases forecast
accuracy.

Despite the existence of a large body of literature on the effects of various
disclosure regulations on management earnings forecast decisions, my study
extends the literature in two important ways. First, the existing studies focus on
management earnings forecast decisions in either purely voluntary or purely
mandatory regimes. Few studies examine how China’s unique regulations (i.e. the
selective mandatory disclosure requirement) can influence both the quantity and
the quality of management earnings forecast decisions. Many studies that examine
the issuing of management earnings forecasts in voluntary regimes find that this is
affected by managers’ incentives (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Baginski et al., 2002;
Brockman et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2013; Frankel et al., 1995; Koch, 2002; Li et
al., 2012; Matsumoto, 2002; Noe, 1999; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Ruland et al.,
1990). For example, Baginski et al. (2002) find that managers in Canada are more
likely to issue forecasts than managers in the U.S., due to lower litigation risks.
9

Other studies show that managerial incentives influence the quality of voluntary
earnings forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) finds that managers are likely to release
downward-biased forecasts to avoid negative earnings surprises when actual
earnings are disclosed. Previous studies also find that ownership structure and
board composition influence the occurrence of voluntary disclosures and their
quality. Ajinkya et al. (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and El-Gazzar (1998)
show that institutional ownership is associated with a greater likelihood of earnings
forecasts. Furthermore, the findings of Ajinkya et al. (2005) suggest that an
increase in the proportion of outside directors leads to more earnings forecasts.
They also find that a higher proportion of outside directors and greater institutional
ownership are associated with more-specific, more-accurate and less-optimistically
biased forecasts.

Other streams of research look at management earnings forecasts in purely
mandatory regimes. For example, Kato et al. (2009) study management earnings
forecasts in Japan, where these forecasts are effectively mandated. Similar to the
quality of management earnings forecasts in voluntary environments, their study
indicates that forecast optimism is affected by the incentives of managers and by
the ownership structure. Jelic et al. (1998) study the accuracy of earnings forecasts
in IPO prospectuses in Malaysia, where firms are required to include earnings
forecasts in their prospectuses. However, they do not find evidence that corporate
governance is associated with forecast accuracy. Instead, they find that firm
operating age is inversely related to forecast error.

The majority of the existing studies focus on management earnings forecasts in
10

either voluntary or mandatory regulated regimes. In this paper, I study management
earnings forecast decisions and the quality of the forecasts under a unique
regulation that integrates elements of both the mandatory and voluntary regimes. I
specifically examine the interaction between the voluntary and the mandatory
elements of the regulation—how a firm’s decision to make a voluntary disclosure is
related to the mandatory forecasting experience/requirements of that firm and of its
peers.

Second, previous studies tend to focus on how the regulations themselves can
affect the disclosure incentives of forecasting firms. My study focuses on some of
the market-wide and intertemporal effects of the regulations (i.e. peer and learning
effects) that can affect forecast decisions. Learning effects have been shown to be
an important factor in influencing the earnings forecasts of analysts (Clement and
Tse, 2003; Hilary and Shen, 2013; Mikhail et al., 2003). However, there is little
evidence on whether and how the quality of management earnings forecasts is
related to the forecasting experience of firms. Several recent studies examine the
spillover effects of accounting restatements. For example, Xu et al. (2006) and
Gleason et al. (2008) find that restatement results in an increase in the cost of
capital not only for the restating firm, but also for its competitors. Sadka (2006)
and Beatty et al. (2013) find that misreporting by firms can have spillover effects
on real investment. However, no previous study examines whether there are peer
effects on these corporate disclosure decisions. I extend the literature by examining
whether and how management earnings forecast decisions in China are influenced
by peer effects.
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2.3. Hypotheses Development.
According to Einhorn and Ziv (2008), a long history of no disclosure will build a
reputation of being uninformed, which alleviates the negative market reaction to
the withholding of information in the current period and facilitates the continued
suppression of information in the future. Once such a reputation is built, it is
difficult to break the stickiness of not providing disclosures, because the high
indirect disclosure costs 1 generated by such stickiness inhibit firms from
disclosing information. Thus, if a firm has a long history of withholding
information, it is difficult to motivate that firm to make a voluntary disclosure.
However, the selective mandatory forecast requirement acts as an intervention that
breaks such stickiness because it mandates firms to issue a forecast under certain
conditions. Once a firm has been mandated to issue a forecast, it reveals to the
public that the firm was in possession of private information and is capable of
issuing a forecast. This will weaken the firm’s reputation for being uninformative
and will increase its costs of non-disclosure. Furthermore, the previous mandatory
forecast will already have revealed some information to market participants such as
competitors, labor unions, regulators and tax authorities. This will lower the
proprietary costs of disclosure faced by firms if they choose to issue a forecast in
the future. In addition, there are also direct costs involved in preparing
management earnings forecasts. Issuing a forecast involves information collection
and estimation, which is often difficult and costly, especially given the
forward-looking nature of the forecasts (Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). As the
establishment of data collection and forecasting technology often entails a fixed
cost, the existence of previous forecasting experience will lower the direct costs
1

The indirect disclosure costs include (a) future incremental disclosure costs; (b) reduced leeway to withhold
information in the future; (c) increased price volatility due to the dependence of future stock prices on uncertain
information.
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involved in issuing a subsequent forecast.

Given that a firm will gain benefits from issuing a voluntary forecast, the increase
in the cost of non-disclosure and the reduction in both the direct and the indirect
costs of disclosure will increase the probability of the firm issuing a voluntary
forecast if that firm was previously required to make a forecast according to the
regulations. This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: A firm is more likely to participate in the disclosure of management earnings
forecasts if it was required to issue a forecast in the past.

China’s selective mandatory forecast requirement means that some firms are
required to issue management earnings forecasts from time to time. Forecasters
may become more attractive to investors than non-forecasters because investors
have more information about the former. If peer effects exist, a firm is more likely
to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily if more firms in its industry are required to
issue such forecasts. Furthermore, the existence of a large number of forecasters in
an industry will also lower the proprietary cost of disclosure faced by a firm
because market participants can obtain information on that firm through the
forecasts issued by its peer firms, even if the firm itself does not issue a forecast.
The lower proprietary costs of disclosure will also increase the likelihood of a firm
issuing a voluntary forecast. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
H2a: A firm is more likely to issue a voluntary earnings forecast if more peer firms
have issued mandatory management earnings forecasts

Peer effects may emerge when a significant proportion of a firm’s peers issue
13

mandatory earnings forecasts. If H2a is true, the mandatory requirement will also
give rise to a large number of voluntary forecasters. For the same reasons as given
above for mandatory forecasters, I also expect the existence of a large number of
voluntary forecasters in an industry to increase the probability of a firm issuing a
voluntary forecast. My hypothesis is as follows:
H2b: A firm is more likely to issue a voluntary earnings forecast if more of its peer
firms have issued voluntary management earnings forecasts.

Previous studies (Clement and Tse, 2003; Hilary and Shen, 2013; Mikhail et al.,
2003) show that the accuracy of analyst forecasts increases with analysts’
firm-specific forecasting experience because more-experienced analysts can
incorporate more prior earnings information. Gilson et al. (2001) show that
forecasts issued by specialist analysts are more accurate than those issued by
non-specialists, which also suggests the benefit of experience. Gong et al. (2011)
find that earnings forecast error is smaller for a firm with a longer forecasting
experience. Although managers tend to possess inside information on their firms,
the issuing of management earnings forecasts involves expertise, the ability to
understand the operations of the firm and the ability to predict the state of the
industry, market conditions and development. Thus, I expect that learning effects
will also exist in management earnings forecasts. Hence:
H3: Management earnings forecast quality increases with a firm’s forecasting
experience.

A major insight from corporate voluntary disclosure is that firms can obtain various
benefits from providing accurate and good-quality corporate information, such as
14

increases in liquidity (e.g. Lang and Maffett 2011), lower capital costs (e.g.
Botosan 1997) and a greater capacity to raise external capital (e.g. Shroff et al.
2013). If investors tend to evaluate and choose firms on the basis of their disclosure
quality, there will be a peer effect whereby firms must compete with or at least
match their peers in terms of disclosure quality. Hidalgo Cabrillana (2013) suggests
that industry competition increases the quality of financial accounting reports
because in more-competitive environments, more firms are competing for funds
and thus firms will react by offering high-quality financial reporting as a signal to
the capital market. Thus, if more firms in an industry are offering higher-quality
management earnings forecasts to attract funds, then all of the firms in that industry
will come under greater pressure to increase the quality of their management
earnings forecasts. This leads to my final hypothesis:
H4: A firm is more likely to issue high-quality forecasts if the management
earnings forecasts issued by its peers are of a high quality.

15

Chapter 3. Data and Sample

3.1. Sample Selection.
This study uses management earnings forecast data collected from the WIND
database. Because major revisions to the management earnings forecast regulations
were completed in 2006, I only use observations for 2007-2013. This gives 29,908
observations in the initial sample. I exclude pre-announcements from the sample
because these are made after the end of the accounting period, when managers
already know what has happened during that period. Thus, the accuracy of
pre-announcements will differ from that of earnings forecasts.

Accounting and governance data are collected from the CSMAR and RESSET
databases. To calculate firm operating performance, I require observations to
contain time-series accounting and financial information for at least the previous
two years. There must also be sufficient information on the corporate board to
capture corporate governance characteristics. This gives 10,725 observations in my
final sample. Panel A of Table 2 describes the screening process used to select the
sample of management earnings forecasts used in my analysis.

[Insert Table 2]

3.2 Descriptive Evidence of an Increase in Voluntary Management Earnings
Forecast Participation.

I classify all of the management earnings forecasts in the final sample into two
16

categories according to China’s management earnings forecast regulations. If a firm
experiences change in profits of more than 50%, makes a loss, or changes from
loss-making to profit-making, I classify its management earnings forecasts as
mandatory (MANDATORY). Other forecasts

are

classified

as

voluntary

(VOLUNTARY). Panel B of Table 2 presents the time-series distribution of my
sample. As shown, the number of total management earnings forecasts increases
over the sample period, from 1,076 in 2007 to 2,479 in 2013 (column 2). However,
the increase in the number of voluntary earnings forecasts is more dramatic,
increasing from 104 to 1,320 over the sample period (column 3). Column 4 clearly
shows that the percentage of voluntary management earnings forecasts increased
by 43% over the seven-year period. Panel C of Table 2 reports the distribution of
voluntary forecasts and the total number of forecasters. As shown, the proportion of
voluntary forecasting firms increased from 12% in 2007 to 60% in 2013, indicating
an increased propensity for firms to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily.

3.3. Descriptive Evidence of Improvement in Management Earnings Forecast
Quality.
The main measures of management earnings forecast quality are PRECISION,
ERROR and BIAS (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). Panel D of Table
2 reports the distribution of management earnings forecast precision. All of the
forecasts are classified into four groups: point, range, open-ended and qualitative.
The table shows that a large proportion of the forecasts are range forecasts (62%).
Moreover, following Ajinkya et al. (2005), I assign four ordered values to all of the
forecasts based on their level of precision (PRECISION). Because point forecasts
are the most precise, PRECISION is set to 3. For range forecasts, open-ended
17

forecasts and qualitative forecasts, PRECISION takes the values of 2, 1 and 0,
respectively. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the ascending trend of average forecast
precision by fiscal year. It clearly shows an improvement in management earnings
forecast quality when judged on the basis of precision, with the average value
increasing from 1.12 to 1.79 over the sample period. Moreover, the average
precision of voluntary management earnings forecasts is seen to be higher than that
for mandatory earnings forecasts.

[Insert Figure 1]

To identify the trend in forecast accuracy, I follow previous papers (Ajinkya et al.,
2005; Gong et al., 2011; Gong et al., 2009; Hilary et al., 2014; Rogers and Stocken,
2005) by only including point and range forecasts in the accuracy analysis. To
measure forecast accuracy I use ERROR, which is the absolute value of the
difference between forecasted and actual profit, scaled by the product of shares
outstanding and price at the beginning of the fiscal year (Ajinkya et al., 2005). For
range forecasts, I use the mid-point as a proxy for the expectations of managers.
The smaller the value of ERROR, the more accurate the management earnings
forecast. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the downward trend of average management
earnings forecast error over the sample period, indicating an improvement in
management earnings forecast accuracy, from 1.96 in 2007 to 0.05 in 2013. It also
demonstrates that, on average, voluntary management earnings forecasts are more
accurate.

A third measure of forecast quality is BIAS, defined as the difference between
18

forecasted and actual profit, scaled by the product of shares outstanding and price
at the beginning of the fiscal year (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Panel C of Figure 1
displays the average bias. Although the average bias fluctuates over the period,
there is a clear downward trend. Firms tend to downward-bias their earnings
forecasts less in 2013 (0.07) than in 2007 (1.30). The figures also shows that
voluntary management earnings forecasts become more conservative.

Overall, the descriptive evidence in Figure 1 reveals a significant improvement in
management earnings forecast quality.
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Chapter 4. Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts

The previous chapter revealed increased participation in voluntary earnings
forecasting. This section further examines the factors that drive the voluntary
earnings forecast disclosure decisions of firms.

4.1 Variables for Testing the Effect of the Selective Mandatory Forecast
Requirement on Voluntary Earnings Forecast Decisions.
I expect the selective mandatory forecast requirement to have a positive influence
on the voluntary disclosure decisions of firms. That is, if a firm is required to issue
management earnings forecasts this year, that firm is more likely to issue
management earnings forecasts voluntarily next year. To test this, I define the
issuing of mandatory management earnings forecasts as PRE_MANDATORY,
which equals 1 if a firm has been required to issue management earnings forecasts
in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.

4.2. Variables for Testing Peer Effects on Voluntary Earnings Forecast
Disclosure Decisions.
To examine the relationship between a firm’s voluntary forecast disclosure decision
and its peers that are mandated to issue management earnings forecasts, I use
MANDATORY_PROP, which is the proportion of peer firms in the industry that
were required to release management earnings forecasts in the previous year. A
larger MANDATORY_PROP value indicates that more firms in the industry issued
mandatory earnings forecasts in the previous year. I expect a positive association
between MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY.
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Similarly, to test whether more voluntary earnings forecasts from peer firms are
influencing disclosure I use VOLUNTARY_PROP, which is the proportion of peer
firms that have issued management earnings forecasts voluntarily in the previous
year. I also expect the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PROP to be positive.

4.3. Empirical Design.
To test my hypotheses, I estimate the following regression:
VOLUNTARY = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 PRE_MANDATORY + 𝛼2 MANDATORY_PROP +
𝛼3 VOLUNTARY_PROP + Control Variables

(1)

The control variables are VOLUNTARY_PRE, MANDATORY, HORIZON, NEWS,
ROA, VOL, LST, SIZE, M/B, LEV, OUT, INST, DUALIT, METING, TOP, ANALYST,
SOE, MINDEX and ACCRUAL (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). In
the regression, I use a Probit model with standard errors clustered at both the firm
and the year levels. I also control for year and industry fixed effects.

The variables in model (1) are defined in the Appendix and are explained as
follows. In the regression, I use firm-specific control variables2 that may affect
disclosure decisions. First, I include VOLUNTARY_PRE because whether a firm
voluntarily discloses earnings forecasts may affect the firm’s disclosure decision in
the current period. Second, findings from Kasznik and Lev (1995) suggest that to
prevent litigation, a firm is more likely to make a disclosure when its earnings are
disappointing. I thus control for return on assets (ROA) and news (NEWS), which

2

For detailed definitions, please refer to the Appendix.
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equal 1 if the profit in the current forecasting period is larger than or equal to that
of the same forecasting period in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. I include
earnings volatility (VOL) because this affects the ability of managers to generate
forecasts (Waymire, 1985). In addition, I control for the number of years that a firm
has been listed because disclosure behavior is likely to vary with public familiarity
with a firm (Chen et al., 2008). Compared with newly listed firms, investors know
more about firms that have been listed for a long time and may thus demand less
information from this type of firm. Also, Cox (1985) and Eng and Mak (2003) find
that larger firms are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts, and thus I
control for firm size (SIZE). I also include firm growth (M/B) because the value of
a firm’s growth hinges on its expected future cash flows and growing firms may
have greater information asymmetry issues and agency costs (Gong et al., 2009). In
this situation, growing firms are expected to disclose more information to the
public. Eng and Mak (2003) find an inverse relationship between debt and
disclosure; thus, I include leverage (LEV). Previous studies, such as those of
Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Eng and Mak (2003), find that corporate governance is
closely associated with voluntary disclosure. Thus, to control for corporate
governance I include the proportion of outside directors (OUT), the proportion of
shares held by institutions (INST), CEO duality (DUALIT), the number of board
meetings (MEETING) and the percentage of shares held by the largest 10
shareholders (TOP). I also control for analyst coverage (ANALYST) because firms
with more analyst coverage are under greater pressure from analysts to provide
earnings forecasts. Additionally, I control for state ownership (SOE) because
Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) find that greater political involvement leads to a lower
incidence of earnings forecasts, as bureaucrats have the incentive to suppress
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information disclosure to hide their expropriation of firms. Moreover, I include a
comprehensive index of provincial market development (MINDEX) to control for
the market development in the province in which the firm is located, because
previous research finds an the association between the behavior of a firm and the
market development in the firm’s location (Firth et al., 2011). Finally, as Francis et
al. (2008) find that the incidence of voluntary disclosure is positively associated
with earnings quality, I include total accruals (ACCRUAL) as a proxy for earnings
quality.

4.4. Main Analysis.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics based on 28,909 observations.
This includes firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither
voluntary nor mandatory forecasts. The mean value of VOLUNTARY is 0.13 and
the mean value of MANDATORY_PRE is 0.30, showing that on average 13% of the
firms in the sample issued voluntary forecasts in a given accounting period and 30%
of the firms were mandated to release earnings forecasts in the previous year. As
shown in the table, the mean values of MANDATORY_PROP and of
VOLUNTARY_PROP are 0.39 and 0.18, respectively. This suggests that, on average,
39% of the firms in an industry issued mandatory forecasts in the previous year
while 18% issued voluntary forecasts. The pairwise correlations between voluntary
disclosure and the key explanatory variables are reported in Panel B of Table 3.
Consistent

with

my

hypotheses,

I

find

that

MANDATORY_PRE,

MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP are positively correlated with
VOLUNTARY. Finally, the correlations between the variables of interest and the
other control variables are modest, implying that multi-collinearity may not be of
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concern in generating inferences.
[Insert Table 3]

Table 4 reports univariate comparisons of the determinants of voluntary
participation. Compared with firms that do not issue either mandatory or voluntary
management earnings forecasts, firms that issue voluntary earnings forecasts have
significantly

higher

mean

PRE_MANDATORY,

MANDATORY_PROP

and

VOLUNTARY_PROP values. This suggests that both selective disclosure
requirement effects and peer effects are important determinants of voluntary
disclosure.

[Insert Table 4]

The Probit analysis of the determinants of firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions are
presented in column 1 of Table 5. The coefficient for PRE_MANDATORY is
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, consistent with my
expectation that if a firm was required to issue a management earnings forecast in
the previous year, it is more likely to disclose management earnings forecasts
voluntarily in the current period. This provides evidence that China’s management
earnings forecast regulation may facilitate the issuing of earnings forecasts. As
shown, the coefficients for both MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP
are significantly positive at the conventional level, supporting a strong and positive
relationship between the proportion of peer firms that had issued management
earnings forecasts mandatorily or voluntarily and a firm’s voluntary disclosure
decision. Moreover, the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PROP is greater than that for
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MANDATORY_PROP, indicating that voluntary forecasting peers have a greater
influence on the voluntary disclosure of firms than mandatory forecasting peers.

Turning to the control variables, I find significantly negative coefficients for VOL,
LEV, ACCRUAL and SOE. The negative coefficient for VOL is consistent with the
view that it is more difficult for a firm that has had volatile earnings in the past to
predict its earnings, and thus it is less likely that the firm will issue an earnings
forecast. The negative coefficients for LEV, ACCRUAL and SOE show that a firm is
less likely to issue a forecast if it has more debt or more accruals or if it is a
state-owned enterprise. In addition, I find the coefficient for VOLUNTARY_PRE to
be positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that if a firm
has issued earnings forecasts voluntarily in the previous year it is more likely to do
so in the current period. The positive coefficient for ROA shows that firms with
better profits are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts. The corporate
governance factors, including INST, DUALITY and MEETING, are significant in
explaining the occurrence of voluntary management earnings forecasts. The
coefficient for INST is positive and influential, consistent with the finding of
Ajinkya et al. (2005) that institutional ownership is associated with a greater
likelihood of earnings forecasts. Finally, the coefficients for ANALYST and
MINDEX are positive, implying that a firm tends to forecast voluntarily if it has
more analysts following it or if it is located in a more developed province.

[Insert Table 5]
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4.5. Sub-sample Analysis.
Table 5 reports the results of analysis after partitioning the sample based on
volatility and state ownership. In columns 1 and 2, the sample is partitioned into
two groups with more or less volatile profits in the past eight quarters. I find that
MANDATORY_PRE is significantly positive in both sub-samples, suggesting that
the mandatory forecast requirement encourages voluntary disclosure.

In addition, I find that MANDATORY_PROP and VOLUNTARY_PROP are
significantly positive for those firms with a relatively lower volatility. The results
suggest that both voluntary and mandatory forecasters generate pressure on these
firms to make voluntary disclosures. However, for those firms with a relatively
higher

volatility

MANDATORY_PROP

is

statistically

insignificant

and

VOLUNTARY_PROP is significantly positive. These results suggest that only
voluntary forecasters are able to generate pressure on these firms. The absence of
significant pressure from mandatory forecasters on firms in a more-volatile
business environment may be due to the greater forecasting difficulty faced by
managers. If the majority of forecasters are mandatory rather than voluntary,
market participation may not punish these firms heavily and thus the cost of
non-disclosure is low. However, the cost of non-disclosure for a particular firm will
increase substantially if a large number of firms in the industry have issued
forecasts voluntarily. The reasoning above may explain why pressure from
voluntary forecasters is significant and stronger for firms in a highly volatile
business environment.

[Insert Table 6]
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I further partition the sample based on state ownership. I find that
MANDATORY_PRE is economically significant for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The
results suggest that the selective mandatory forecast requirement promotes
voluntary disclosure for firms with different types of ownership. In contrast, peer
effects are more observable in non-SOEs than in SOEs: peer effects from
mandatory forecasters are significant in both sub-samples while peer effects from
voluntary forecasters are only significant in non-SOEs. A plausible explanation is
that SOEs in China have less need to please investors and compete with peer firms,
because they are often protected in product markets and enjoy better access to
finance. (Lu et al., 2012).
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Chapter 5. Management Earnings Forecast Quality

In Chapter 3, I found that the management earnings forecast quality, which is
judged on the basis of PRECISION, ERROR and BIAS (see the Appendix for
definitions of variables), improves over the sample period. In this section, I
investigate the forces underlying the improvement in the quality of the
management earnings forecasts.

5.1. Variables for Testing Peer Effects on Disclosure Quality.
I use the industry-average management earnings forecast quality in the previous
year (excluding the forecasting quality of the focal firm) as a proxy for industry
peer effects. The variables are PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and
PEER_BIAS (see the Appendix for definitions of variables). Higher values for
PEER_PRECISION and lower values for PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS indicate
that the forecasting quality of peer firms is higher. If pressure from peer firms
promotes improved management earnings forecast quality, I should find a positive
association between the industry-average earnings forecast quality in the previous
year and the firm’s forecast quality.

5.2. Variables for Testing the Effects of Forecasting Experience on Disclosure
Quality.
To examine whether more forecasting experience leads to higher forecast quality, I
use MF_YEARS to account for the forecasting experience accumulated by firms.
MF_YEARS is defined as the number of years that the firm has issued management
earnings forecasts. If management earnings forecast quality increases as firms gain
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more experience, I should find a positive association between MF_YEARS and
forecast quality.

5.3. Empirical Design.
To test my hypotheses, I regress industry pressure and firms’ forecasting experience
on various aspects of management earnings forecast quality and control variables
including MANDATORY, HORIZON, NEWS, ROA, VOL, LST, SIZE, M/B, LEV,
OUT, INST, DUALIT, MEETING TOP, ANALYST, SOE, MINDEX and ACCRUAL
(see the Appendix for definitions of variables):
PRECISION = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 PEER_PRECISION + 𝛼2 MF_YEARS + Control Variables
(2)
ERROR = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 PEER_ ERROR + 𝛼2 MF_YEARS + Control Variables

(3)

BIAS = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 PEER_ BIAS + 𝛼2 MF_YEARS + Control Variables

(4)

Because PRECISION is an ordinal variable, I use an ordered Probit model to
estimate model (2). I estimate models (3) and (4) using Ordinary Least Squares. I
use standard errors clustered at both the firm and the year levels. I also control for
year and industry fixed effects in all of the models.

I add several factors that might affect management earnings forecast quality. First, I
control for forecast type (MANDATORY) because the incentive to issue a voluntary
forecast is different from the incentive to issue a mandatory forecast. Many studies
(Brockman et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2011; Gong et al., 2009;
Rogers and Stocken, 2005) find that manager incentives affect forecasting quality. I
include the length of the forecasting horizon (HORIZON) because studies such as
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those of Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002), Ajinkya et al. (2005)
and Cheng et al. (2013) suggest that the quality of management earnings forecasts
is highly correlated with the length of the forecasting horizon. Following Ajinkya
et al. (2005), I further include news (NEWS) to control for litigation. I also control
for return on assets (ROA) because Gong et al. (2009) find a positive relationship
between ROA and forecast error. In addition, because forecasting difficulty is
closely associated with forecast quality (Cheng et al., 2013; Rogers and Stocken,
2005), I include profit volatility as a proxy for forecasting difficulty. Moreover,
research suggests that firms are more likely to provide high-quality earnings
forecasts when the market demands more information (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Cheng
et al., 2013). Thus, I include the number of listing years (LST), firm size (SIZE),
firm growth opportunities (M/B), analyst coverage (ANALYST), leverage ratio (LEV)
and state ownership (SOE) to capture the market demand for information. To
control for the effect of corporate governance on disclosure quality, I add various
other factors: the proportion of outside directors (OUT), the proportion of shares
held by institutions (INST), CEO duality (DUALIT), the number of board meetings
(MEETING) and the percentage of shares held by the largest 10 shareholders (TOP)
(Ajinkya et al., 2005; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Cheng et al., 2013; Karamanou
and Vafeas, 2005). Due to a firm’s behavior being associated with the market
development in the firm’s location (Firth et al., 2011), I include MINDEX to control
for the market development in the province in which the firm is located. Finally, I
control for total accruals (ACCRUAL) because Gong et al. (2009) find that forecast
bias is associated with accruals in the previous year.
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5.4. Main Analysis.
Panel A of Table 7 outlines the descriptive statistics for my sample of 10,725
observations. The average precision (PRECISION) and average forecast error
(ERROR) are 1.624 and 0.303, respectively. Similar to studies conducted in the U.S.
(e.g. Gong et al. 2009), I find that the average bias (BIAS) (0.163) is positive,
suggesting that management earnings forecasts in China are also more likely to be
optimistically biased. The average experience of forecasting firms (MF_YEARS) is
about 4.67 years; the average values of peer precision (PEER_PRECISION), peer
error (PEER_ERROR) and peer bias (PEER_BIAS) are 1.577, 0.362 and 0.208,
respectively. On average, 61.6% of the forecasts are mandatory. Of the mandatory
earnings forecasts, 3,374 are good forecasts and 3,231 are bad forecasts. The mean
values of error (FIRST_ERROR) and bias (FIRST_BIAS) for the first forecasts
issued by firms are 0.569 and 0.366, respectively, which are higher than the mean
forecast error (ERROR) and the mean forecast bias (BIAS). Similarly, the average
precision (FIRST_PRECISION) of a firm’s first forecast is 1.24, which is lower
than the average forecast precision (PRECISION). This is not surprising, as the
quality of management earnings forecasts improves over the years, as shown in
Chapter 3.

[Insert Table 7]

Panel B of Table 7 contains pairwise correlations between forecast quality,
forecasting experience, peer forecasting quality and other regressors. All of the
correlation results are consistent with my expectations. Both MF_YEARS and
PEER_PRECISION are positively correlated with PRECISION. MF_YEARS is
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negatively correlated with ERROR and BIAS. Finally, the correlation between
PEER_ERROR and ERROR and that between PEER_BIAS and BIAS are positive.
Furthermore, given the magnitude of the correlation between the independent
variables and PRECISION (ERROR or BIAS), I conclude that the tests are not
subject to multi-collinearity.

Univariate comparisons are presented in Table 8. Panel A presents the means for
firm forecasting experience (MF_YEARS), industry average forecast precision
(PEER_PRECISION) and forecast type (MANDATORY) across high- and
low-precision portfolios. The differences in the means for MF_YEARS,
PEER_PRECISION and MANDATORY for high- and low-precision forecasts are
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that learning effects and peer
effects are important determinants of forecast precision. This also implies that
mandatory forecasts tend to be less precise than voluntary forecasts. The results of
univariate analysis of the determinants of forecast accuracy are presented in Panel
B of Table 8. The mean number of forecasting years (MF_YEARS) is significantly
greater in the more accurate portfolio, while industry forecast error (PEER_ERROR)
is significantly larger in the less accurate portfolio. However, I find no difference in
accuracy between voluntary and mandatory forecasts. Panel C of Table 8 presents
the univariate statistics separately for sub-samples of forecasts with different levels
of bias. Managers with more earnings forecasting experience (MF_YEARS) tend to
issue less-optimistically biased forecasts than managers with less forecasting
experience (MF_YEARS), and the difference is statistically significant at the 1
percent level. Moreover, if peer earnings forecasts are more conservative on
average in the previous year (PEER_BIAS), then firms have a higher likelihood of
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issuing less-optimistically biased forecasts. Finally, MANDATORY also differs
significantly between less-optimistically biased and more-optimistically biased
portfolios. Overall, the evidence from the univariate analysis is consistent with my
expectations.

[Insert Table 8]

Table 9 reports the results of analyzing the link between management earnings
forecast quality and firms’ forecasting experience and peer firm forecast quality.
Column 1 shows the analysis when the dependent variable is PRECISION. As
expected, the coefficient of MF_YEARS is positive and significant at the 0.01 level,
suggesting that earnings forecasts tend to be more precise if the forecaster has more
forecasting experience. Thus, it appears that firms with more forecasting
experience are more likely to make more-specific disclosures. Although the
coefficient for PEER_PRECISION is positive but insignificant, this still implies a
positive peer effect on forecasting precision. Of the control variables, those that
capture corporate governance, DUALIT, MEETING and TOP, are all statistically
significant, suggesting that the precision of management earnings forecasts is
closely associated with corporate governance.

[Insert Table 9]

Column 2 of Table 9 presents the correlation results for industry average forecast
error, forecasting experience and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts.
Firm forecasting experience (MF_YEARS) is, as expected, positively (negatively)
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correlated with management earnings forecast accuracy (ERROR), with the
coefficient being statistically significant at the 0.01 level. If the forecasts of peer
firms are more accurate (contain less error), this puts pressure on other firms to
issue more-accurate forecasts. The regression result reflects this phenomenon: the
coefficient for PEER_ERROR is positively associated with the forecast error and is
statistically significant at the conventional level. Of the control variables,
MANDATORY, SIZE and INST are influential. The coefficient for MANDATORY is
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that mandatory
management earnings forecasts are less accurate than voluntary forecasts.
Voluntary forecasters are supposed to have more incentive to disclose information
to investors and thus have more motivation to provide accurate forecasts. The
coefficient of SIZE is also positively correlated with the dependent variable and is
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding implies that larger firms issue
less-accurate earnings forecasts because it may be more difficult for them to make
forecasts in comparison with small firms. The negative coefficient on INST
suggests that firms with more institutional investors tend to issue more-accurate
earnings forecasts.

Column 3 of Table 9 presents regression results for peer effect, forecasting
experience and bias in management earnings forecasts. Firm forecasting experience,
proxied by MF_YEARS, is negatively associated with BIAS. Thus, it seems that
firms with more forecasting experience are likely to produce more-conservative
forecasts (less-optimistic bias). Consistent with my expectations, the coefficient for
PEER_BIAS is positive and statistically significant at the conventional level,
implying that firms tend to issue less-optimistically biased earnings forecasts if
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their peer firms’ forecasts are less-optimistically biased. Of the control variables,
the coefficient for NEWS is influential and significantly positive at the 0.01 level,
implying that firms tend to optimistically bias earnings forecasts if they have good
news.

MANDATORY is also interesting in terms of explaining forecasting bias: the results
show that mandatory forecasts are less accurate and more biased than voluntary
forecasts, and suggest that disclosures issued under managers’ own initiative are of
a higher quality than disclosures issued under the mandatory requirement. More
importantly, the results indicate that the management earnings forecast regulation is
successful, leading to more and higher-quality voluntary disclosures.

On the whole, my evidence suggests that the forecasting performance of peer firms
is the benchmark when firms are considering their own forecast quality. These
results are also consistent with my expectation that forecasting experience is
associated with management earnings forecast quality. Firms with more forecasting
experience tend to issue more-specific, more-accurate and less-biased forecasts.

5.5. Additional Tests.
A concern with the foregoing findings is that firms with better forecasting
performance are more likely to issue forecasts and thereby accumulate more
forecasting experience. Another concern is that unobservable factors associated
with firm characteristics might be important determinants of forecast quality. To
alleviate such concerns, I include the quality of firms’ first forecasts, i.e.
FIRST_PRECISION, FIRST_ERROR and FIRST_BIAS, in columns 1-3 of Table 10.
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This is because the quality of firms’ first forecasts captures unobservable factors
related to the quality of the current forecasts and captures firms’ past forecasting
performance. I do not use the quality of firms’ last forecasts because this is highly
correlated with current forecast quality. In these regressions, I eliminate the firms’
first forecasts from the sample to avoid perfect collinearity. As shown, forecasting
experience (MF_YEARS) continues to be statistically significant at the
conventional level, suggesting that firms with a longer forecasting history tend to
issue more-precise, more-accurate and less-biased forecasts. Consistent with the
previous finding, there is a positive association between the forecast precision of a
firm and that of its peers, but the effect is not significant. Similarly, I find that the
forecast accuracy and bias of firms are significantly influenced by those of its peers.
Collectively, the results corroborate my previous findings.

To pursue forecast accuracy, managers may sacrifice forecast precision. Thus, in
additional tests I control for the effect of forecast precision (columns 4-5 of Table
10) on forecast error and bias, respectively. The results for MF_YEARS,
PEER_PRECISION and PEER_BIAS confirm the previous finding that a firm’s
forecast quality is affected by its forecasting experience and the average forecast
quality of its peer firms.

Finally, columns 6-7 of Table 10 report the results after controlling for the quality
of a firm’s first forecast and the forecast precision in the current period. The
coefficients for MF_YEARS remain negative and statistically significant at the
conventional level when the dependent variables are forecast error and bias.
Overall, these findings suggest that the learning effect is an important determinant
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of forecast error and forecast bias. Further, consistent with the previous results,
PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS continue to be associated with forecast error and
forecast bias, respectively, suggesting that managers take into account the quality
of peer firms’ forecasts when issuing their own forecasts. Finally, I find that
MANDATORY is consistently effective in explaining forecast quality, suggesting
that voluntary forecasts are of a higher quality than mandatory forecasts.

[Insert Table 10]

5.6. Endogeneity Tests.
A concern relating to peer effects on forecast quality is that the common variables
shared among firm and peer groups may determine forecast quality. In my main
test, I include an industry dummy to mitigate this concern. To further address this
issue, I include two instrumental variables and use the two-stage method to
re-estimate my model. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), my first instrument
variable is peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return because this is unlikely to be
correlated with firm characteristics (Leary and Roberts, 2014). Moreover, previous
research (Cheng et al., 2013; Rogers and Stocken, 2005) shows that forecasting
difficulty is associated with forecast quality and can be proxied by idiosyncratic
equity return. My second instrumental variable is peer firms’ forecasting
experience, which is unlikely to affect individual the forecast quality of individual
firms but is possibly correlated with the forecast quality of peer firms. Hence, I
estimate the effect of peer firms’ forecast quality on firm forecast quality by using
peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return and peer firms’ forecasting experience. I
estimate the fitted value of peer firms’ forecast
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quality relating to

PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS from the first-stage
estimation in model (5), (6) and (7) and replace these in the second-stage
regression in models (2), (3) and (4).
PEER_PRECISION =𝛼0 +𝛼1 PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + 𝛼2 PEER_MF_YEARS
(5)
PEER_ERROR =𝛼0 +𝛼1 PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + 𝛼2 PEER_MF_YEARS
(6)(6)

PEER_BIAS= a0 + a1 PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK + a2 PEER_MF_YEARS
(7)
where PEER_EQUJTY_SHOCK is the industry a vera ge idiosyncratic stock return
(excluding the focal firm).

I estima te the idiosyncra tic stock return with the following Ca rha rt (1997) four
factor model.

Ri,t

= a0

+

a1 (Rm,t-Rj t)

+

a 2 SMBt

+

a3 HMLt

+ a4 UMDt
(8)

where R;, 1 refers to the excessive stock return for firm i over month t. Rm,1-R;; ,,

SMB1

,

HML1 a nd UMD, a re the excessive ma rket return, the sma ll minus big

portfolio return, the high minus low portfolio return a �d the momentum portfolio
return, respectively. I estima te equa tion (8) for ea ch firm using a monthly rolling
regression, requiring a t lea st 20 months of historica l da ta a nd using up to 24
months of da ta in the estima tions. After obta ining the coefficients, I then use
equa tion (8) to calculate the expected return. The idiosyncratic return is the actual
return minus the expected return. Beca use peer firms' foreca st qua lity relating to

PEER_PRECISJON, PEER ERROR a nd PEER BIAS is the industry-average
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forecast quality in the previous year, I thus require the idiosyncratic stock return to
be the average monthly idiosyncratic stock return in the previous year.
Table 11 reports the results obtained using two-stage model. The coefficients
for peer firms’ forecast quality relating to PEER_PRECISION, PEER_ERROR
and PEER_BIAS are consistent with previous findings shown in Table 9.
More importantly, as shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 11, the
coefficients for PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS are statistically significant,
indicating that peer firms’ forecast accuracy and peer firms’ forecast bias affect
the forecast accuracy and bias, respectively, of individual firms. This shows
that my main results are unlikely to be affected by endogeneity issues.
[Insert Table 11]
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
China introduced a unique regulation in 2000 that required publicly listed firms in
China to make earnings forecasts under certain conditions. Since the introduction
of this regulation, China has witnessed an increase in the quantity of both
mandatory management earnings forecasts and voluntary earnings forecasts.
Furthermore, there has been a substantial and consistent improvement in the quality
of the forecasts issued by firms. In this study, I examine the factors that have driven
the emergence of these voluntary forecasts and the improvement in their quality.

Regarding the determinants of the voluntary disclosure of management earnings
forecasts, I find that firms are more likely to make a voluntary disclosure if they
were required to make a disclosure in the preceding year. Furthermore, I find that
peer pressure motivates firms to voluntarily issue forward-looking information. I
find that learning and peer effects are the most important determinants of
management earnings forecast quality.

Overall, this study provides evidence in support of the argument that the
introduction of the selective mandatory forecast requirement in China may have
had firm-level, market-wide and intertemporal effects. These effects have
encouraged firms to issue forecasts voluntarily and to improve the quality of their
forecasts. The findings of this study contribute to the literature on management
earnings forecasts and to the literature on financial reporting regulations. They also
have practical relevance for investors and policy implications for regulators in
China and other countries.
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Appendix:
Variable Definitions
Forecast Outcome Factors:
VOLUNTARY

= 1 if the earnings forecast firm issues is voluntary forecast, and
0 otherwise. The forecast is classified as voluntary if it does not
meet the following conditions: (a) more than 50% change in
profits; (b) making loss; (c) turning from loss-making to profit
making.

PRECISION

= a measure of management earnings forecast precision. It is 3
for point forecast, 2 for rang forecast, 1 for open-ended forecast
and 0 for qualitative forecast.

ERROR

= absolute value [(management forecast of profit-actual profit) /
(shares outstanding×price at the beginning of the fiscal year)].
It is a measure of forecast error.

BIAS

= [(management forecast of profit-actual profit) / (shares
outstanding×price at the beginning of the fiscal year)]. It is a
measure of forecast bias.

Measures of Selective Disclosure Requirement Effects:
PRE_MANDATORY

= 1 if firm has been required to issue management earnings
forecast in the past one year, and 0 otherwise.

Measures of Peer Effects:
MANDATORY_PROP

= the proportion of firms in the industry which have issued
mandatory management earnings forecasts in the past one year
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28
industries.

VOLUNTARY_PROP

= the proportion of firms in the industry which have issued
voluntary management earnings forecasts in the past one year
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28
industries.

PEER_PRECISION

= the industry average precision of all management earnings
forecasts issued in the past one year (excluding the focal firm).
The industry classification is downloaded from WIND database
which divides firms into 28 industries.

PEER_ERROR

= the industry average error of all management earnings
forecasts issued in the past one year (excluding the focal firm).
The industry classification is downloaded from WIND database
which divides firms into 28 industries.
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PEER_BIAS

= the absolute value of the industry average bias of all
management earnings forecasts issued in the past one year
(excluding the focal firm). The industry classification is
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28
industries.

Measures of Forecasting Experience:
MF_YEARS

= number of years that the firm has issued management earnings
forecasts.

Other Variables:
PRE_VOLUNTARY

= 1 if firm has issued management earnings forecast voluntarily
in the past one year, and 0 otherwise.

NEWS

= 1 if the current-forecasting-period profit is larger than or equal
to the profit of the same forecasting period in the last year, and
0 otherwise.

HORIZON

= number of days between the forecast date and the end of
forecasting period.

MANDATORY

= 1 if the earnings forecast firm issues is mandatory forecast,
and 0 otherwise.

ROA

= return on assets.

VOL

= the natural logarithm of standard deviation of quarterly profits
over past 8 quarters. It captures the forecasting difficulty.

LST

= the number of the year since the firm is listed.

SIZE

= firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year.

M/B

= a ratio of market value to the book value of equity measured
at the beginning of the year.

LEV

= a ratio of total liability to the book value of equity at the
beginning of the fiscal year.

OUT

= proportion of outside directors.

INST

= proportion of shares held by institutions.

DUALIT

= 1 if CEO and chairman positions are possessed by the same
person.

MEETING

= the number of board meetings held annually.

TOP

= percentage of shares held by the largest 10 shareholders.

ANALYST

= number of analysts following the firm.
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SOE

=1 if the firm is the state-owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise.

MINDEX

= a comprehensive index of provincial market development.

ACCRUAL

= a measure of total accruals in prior year. It is (the change in
non-cash current assets - the change in current liabilities
excluding the current proportion of long-term debt –
depreciation and amortization)/lagged total assets

FIRST_ERROR

= the error of firm’s first forecast.

FIRST_BIAS

= the bias of firm’s first forecast

FIRST_PRECISION

= the precision of firm’s first forecast.

PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK

= the industry average idiosyncratic stock return in the past one
year (excluding the focal firm). The idiosyncratic stock return in
the past one year is the monthly average idiosyncratic stock
return in the past one year. The industry classification is
downloaded from WIND database which divides firms into 28
industries.

PEER_MF_YEARS

= the industry average forecasting experience (excluding the
focal firm). The forecasting experience is measured by the
number of years that the firm has issued management earnings
forecasts. The industry classification is downloaded from
WIND database which divides firms into 28 industries.
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Table 1.The Development of Management Earnings Forecast Regulation

Year

Conditions

2000

1.

Making losses;

2001

1.

Making losses;

2.

More than 50% changes in earnings;

3. Small earnings (before taxes) per share last year
(smaller than 0.05) can be exempt.
2006

1.

Making losses;

2.

More than 50% changes in earnings;

3. Small earnings (before taxes) per share last year (0.05
for annual, 0.03 for interim report, 0.04 for the third
quarterly reports) can be exempt.
4.

Turning from loss-making to profit-making.
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Table 2. Sample Selection and Description
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure
Initial sample of all forecasts

29,908

Less:
Pre-announcements

(13,523)

Accounting data unavailable

(5,660)

Usable forecasts

10,725

Panel B: Distribution of Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Number of Voluntary
Forecasts
104
165
360
465
640
1,069
1,320

Number of Total
Forecasts
1,076
962
1,314
1,435
1,405
2,057
2,479

Proportion of Voluntary
Forecasts
10%
17%
27%
32%
46%
52%
53%

Panel C: Distribution of Voluntary Forecasters
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Year

Number of Voluntary
Forecasters
61
106
206
207
314
485
605

Qualitative

Number of Total
Forecasters
515
493
623
602
615
852
1,004

Open-ended

Proportion of Voluntary
Forecasters
12%
22%
33%
34%
51%
57%
60%

Range

Point

2007

337

382

241

116

2008

248

288

308

116

2009

270

212

563

268

2010

231

170

867

167

2011

173

168

981

83

2012

205

172

1,622

58

2013

194

167

2,084

34

1,658

1,559

6,666

842

TOTAL
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Figure 1. Trends of Management Earnings Forecast Quality
Panel A. Trends of Average Forecast Precision

Average Precision
2.5
2
1.5
all forecasts
1

voluntary forecasts

0.5
0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast precision (PRECISION) and mean
voluntary (VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast precision (PRECISION) over the
sample period. PRECISION and VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix.

Panel B. Trends of Average Forecast Error

Average Error
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
all forecasts

1
0.8

voluntary forecasts

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast error (ERROR) and mean
voluntary (VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast error (ERROR) over the sample
period. ERROR and VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix.

46

Figure 1 (continued)
Panel C. Trends of Average Forecast Bias

Average Bias
1.400
1.200
1.000

0.800
all forecasts

0.600

voluntary forecasts

0.400
0.200
0.000
-0.200

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

This panel presents the mean management earnings forecast bias (BIAS) and mean voluntary
(VOLUNTARY) management earnings forecast bias (BIAS) over the sample period. BIAS and
VOLUNTARY are defined in the Appendix.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables for Testing H 1, H2a and H2b

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

VOLUNTARY

0.131

0.337

0

1.000

28,909

MANDATORY_PRE

0.302

0.459

0

1.000

28,909

MANDATORY_PROP

0.394

0.108

0.209

0.588

28,909

VOLUNTARY_PROP

0.183

0.126

0

0.511

28,909

VOLUNTARY_PRE

0.198

0.399

0

1.000

28,909

NEWS

0.600

0.490

0

1.000

28,909

ROA

0.028

0.186

-0.722

28.529

28,909

VOL

16.881

1.344

11.960

24.641

28,909

LST

10.753

5.021

1.786

23.074

28,909

SIZE

22.141

0.967

18.555

28.125

28,909

M/B

3.387

3.272

0.502

23.141

28,909

LEV

1.496

1.783

0.055

12.431

28,909

OUT

0.364

0.052

0.091

0.714

28,909

INST

0.150

0.169

0

0.980

28,909

DUALIT

0.177

0.382

0

1.000

28,909

MEETING

9.365

3.797

1.000

57.000

28,909

TOP

29.441

21.465

0.303

96.139

28,909

ANALYST

10.779

11.510

0

58.000

28,909

SOE

0.554

0.497

0

1.000

28,909

MINDEX

8.884

2.106

0.380

11.800

28,909
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Table 3 (continued)
ACCRUAL

-0.003

0.071

-0.539

0.741

28,909

This panel provides descriptive statistics on variables for the firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither voluntary forecasts nor mandatory
forecasts in the period 2007-2013.
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: Correlations among Regression Variables
(1)
VOLUNTARY

(2)
MANDATORY_PRE

(1)

1

0.053

(2)

0.052

***

1

(3)

0.02

***

0.132

(4)

0.289

***

-0.067

***

(3)

(4)

MANDATORY_PROP

VOLUNTARY_PROP

0.025

0.28

***

0.127

-0.07

***

***

1

0.021

***

***

0.03

1

*, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This panel provides correlations among the key variables for the firms that issued voluntary forecasts and those that issued neither voluntary forecasts nor
mandatory forecasts in the period 2007-2013. Pearson correlations are shown above diagonal and Spearman correlations are shown below diagonal.
See Appendix for variable definitions
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Table 4. Univariate Analysis of Determinants of Voluntary Participation
Mean
VOLUNTARY=1

VOLUNTARY=0

p-value of difference

PRE_MANDATORY

0.364

0.293

<0.01

MANDATORY_PROP

0.277

0.169

<0.01

VOLUNTARY_PROP

0.364

0.293

<0.01

This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms that involve in
voluntary disclosure and those that neither do voluntary forecasts nor mandatory forecasts.
The p-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests.
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 5. Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts
Main Tests
VOLUNTARY
0.542***
(0.041)
0.990*
(0.559)
1.149**
(0.578)

VARIABLES
MANDATORY_PRE
MANDATORY_PROP
VOLUNTARY_PROP
VOLUNTARY_PRE

1.983***
(0.026)
0.0184
(0.024)
0.130*
(0.071)
-0.145***
(0.028)
0.00135
(0.003)
0.00285
(0.026)
-0.0108
(0.009)
-0.0532***
(0.012)
-0.349
(0.262)
0.496***
(0.160)
0.0628**
(0.027)
-0.00841*
(0.004)
0.00161
(0.001)
0.0146***
(0.002)
-0.340***
(0.035)
0.0226***
(0.007)
-0.329*
(0.194)
-0.697
(0.830)

NEWS
ROA
VOL
LST
SIZE
M/B
LEV
OUT
INST
DUALIT
MEETING
TOP
ANALYST
SOE
MINDEX
ACCRUAL
Constant
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Table 5 (continued)
YES
YES

Year Effect
Industry Effect

Pseudo R2
0.5063
Observations
28,909
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This table provides regression results on the relation between voluntary disclosure decision and
selective disclosure requirement effects and peer effects.
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 6: Sub-sample Analysis of the Selective Management Earnings Forecast Effects and Peer Effects on Voluntary Disclosure of Management
Earnings Forecast
Sum-sample Analysis
(1)

(2)

(3)

Volatility
MANDATORY_PRE

Low

SOE

Non-SOE

0.594***

0.524***

0.601***

0.528***

(0.060)

(0.045)

(0.051)

(0.054)

0.070

0.073

0.484

1.417**

0.34

1.345*

(0.690)

(0.561)

(0.585)

(0.704)

Test of difference in 𝛼2
VOLUNTARY_PROP

State Ownership

High

Test of difference in 𝛼1
MANDATORY_PROP

(4)

-0.933

-1.005

1.266***

1.311*

1.301**

1.419*

(0.481)

(0.718)

(0.514)

(0.818)

Test of difference in 𝛼3

-0.045*

-0.118

Control Variables

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year Effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry Effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

Pseudo R2

0.515

0.4847

0.4789

0.4545
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Table 6 (continued)
Observations

13,618

14,966

15,982

12,880

Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent (two-tail), respectively.
This table provides regression results on the voluntary disclosure analysis after partitioning the sample on
volatility and state ownership
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables for Testing H3 and H4
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

MF_YEARS

4.666

2.061

1

13.000

10,725

PRECISION

1.624

0.838

0

3.000

10,725

ERROR

0.303

0.761

0.000

4.778

8,100

BIAS

0.146

0.721

-2.003

4.177

8,100

PEER_PRECISION

1.557

0.316

0.667

1.963

8,100

PEER_ERROR

0.362

0.418

0.003

2.694

8,100

PEER_BIAS

0.208

0.374

0.001

2.367

10,725

MANDATORY

0.616

0.486

0

1.000

10,725

HORIZON

54.510

19.740

1.000

331.000

10,725

NEWS

0.610

0.488

0

1.000

10,725

ROA

0.033

0.228

-2.898

20.790

10,725

VOL

16.800

1.244

13.040

24.270

10,725

LST

7.412

4.866

1.580

21.700

10,725

SIZE

22.000

0.907

19.280

28.230

10,725

M/B

3.502

3.266

0.534

22.770

10,725

LEV

1.322

1.648

0.047

11.500

10,725

OUT

0.364

0.051

0.091

0.667

10,725

INST

0.165

0.181

0

0.957

10,725

DUALIT

0.254

0.435

0

1.000

10,725

MEETING

9.127

3.333

1

35.000

10,725

27.800

21.490

0.303

96.000

10,725

TOP
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Table 7 (continued)
ANALYST

11.390

10.990

0

55.000

10,725

SOE

0.382

0.486

0

1.000

10,725

MINDEX

9.264

2.055

0.380

11.800

10,725

-0.001

0.095

-0.539

0.501

10,725

FIRST_PRECISION

1.235

0.883

0

3.000

10,528

FIRST_ERROR

0.569

0.928

0.000

3.360

4,081

FIRST_BIAS

0.366

0.912

-0.863

3.153

4,081

ACCRUAL

This panel provides descriptive statistics on variables for the firms which issued either mandatory forecasts or voluntary forecasts in the period 2007-2013.
See Appendix for variable definitions.

57

Table 7 (continued)
Panel B: Correlations among Regression Variables

(1)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

MF_YEARS

PRECISION

ERROR

BIAS

1

0.058

*** -0.173 ***

-0.107

(5)

(6)

(7)

PEER_PRECISION PEER_ERROR

(8)

PEER_BIAS

(9)

(10)

FIRST_PRECISION FIRST_ERROR FIRST_ BIAS

0.153 ***

-0.128 ***

-0.09 ***

-0.215 ***

0.054 ***

0.015

(2)

0.103 ***

1

-0.151 ***

-0.12 ***

0.233 ***

0.119 ***

0.067 ***

0.307 ***

-0.077 ***

-0.064 ***

(3)

-0.193 ***

-0.085 ***

1

0.395 ***

-0.217 ***

0.34 ***

0.328 ***

-0.112 ***

0.294 ***

0.193 ***

(4)

-0.147 ***

-0.05 ***

0.562 ***

1

-0.067 ***

0.127 ***

0.154 ***

-0.005

0.144 ***

0.229 ***

(5)

0.175 ***

0.269 ***

-0.322 ***

-0.25

1

-0.441 ***

-0.349 ***

0.271 ***

-0.119 ***

-0.066 ***

(6)

-0.167 ***

0.083 ***

0.275 ***

0.196

-0.479 ***

1

0.719 ***

-0.199 ***

0.123 ***

0.042 ***

(7)

-0.146 ***

0.043 ***

0.277 ***

0.222

-0.465 ***

0.904 ***

1

-0.147 ***

0.115 ***

0.063 ***

(8)

-0.238 ***

-0.005

-0.025 ***

(9)

-0.014

-0.023 **

(10) -0.02

-0.019 *

0.007

-0.086 ***

0.4 ***

0.258 ***

-0.145 ***

0.362 ***

0.363 ***

-0.163 ***

-0.005

0.01

0.12 ***
0.105

0.118 ***
***

0.11

***

1

-0.104 ***

-0.044 ***

-0.213 ***

1

0.472 ***

-0.107 ***

0.761 **

1

*, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This panel provides correlations among the key variables for the firms which issued either mandatory forecasts or voluntary forecasts in the period 2007-2013. Pearson
correlations are shown above diagonal and Spearman correlations are shown below diagonal.
See Appendix for variable definitions
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Table 8. Univariate Analysis of Determinants of Forecast Quality
Panel A:
Mean
High Precision

Low Precision

p-value of difference

MF_YEARS

4.593

5.520

<0.01

PEER_PRECISION

1.590

1.419

<0.01

MANDATORY

0.587

0.950

<0.01

This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue more
precise forecasts (High Precision) and firms which issue less precise forecasts (Low Precision).
The P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests.
See Appendix for variable definitions.

Panel B:
Mean
Low Error

High Error

p-value of difference

MF_YEARS

4.971

4.377

<0.01

PEER_ERROR

0.267

0.458

<0.01

MANDATORY

0.530

0.533

>0.1

This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue more
accurate forecasts (Low Error) and firms which issue less accurate forecasts (High Error). The
P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests.
See Appendix for variable definitions.

Panel C:
Mean
Low Bias

High Bias

p-value of difference

MF_YEARS

4.943

4.404

<0.01

PEER_BIAS

0.173

0.244

<0.01

MANDATORY

0.471

0.592

<0.01

This table provides univariate comparisons on key variables between firms which issue less
biased forecasts (Low Bias) and firms which issue more biased forecasts (High Bias). The
P-values of the difference in means are based on t-tests.
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 9. Determinants of Management Earnings Forecast Quality

MF_YEARS
PEER_PRECISION

(1)

(2)

(3)

PRECISION

ERROR

BIAS

0.0991***

-0.0322***

-0.0187**

(0.012)

(0.008)

(0.008)

0.0214
(0.141)

PEER_ERROR

0.144**
(0.061)

PEER_BIAS

0.233***
(0.065)

MANDATORY
HORIZON
NEWS
ROA
VOL
LST
SIZE
M/B
LEV
OUT
INST
DUALIT
MEETING
TOP
ANALYST

-0.0576**

0.197***

0.104***

(0.027)

(0.020)

(0.019)

-0.00172***

0.00111***

0.000193

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0945***

-0.0199

0.372***

(0.033)

(0.030)

(0.024)

0.211

1.028

0.685

(0.142)

(0.696)

(0.483)

-0.0331*

0.0159

-0.0256**

(0.020)

(0.013)

(0.011)

-0.0423***

-0.00411

0.0022

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.105***

0.105***

0.0865***

(0.032)

(0.024)

(0.021)

-0.00312

-0.0363***

-0.0213***

(0.008)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.0732***

0.000125

0.0181*

(0.015)

(0.012)

(0.011)

0.113

-0.139***

-0.0767

(0.080)

(0.051)

(0.049)

0.0466

-0.0520***

-0.0320*

(0.034)

(0.020)

(0.018)

0.0132**

-0.000684

0.0059

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.00367***

0.00255***

0.00150***

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.00480**

0.00151

0.000403

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.0576**

0.197***

0.104***

(0.027)

(0.020)

(0.019)
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Table 9 (continued)
SOE
MINDEX
ACCRUAL
cut1

-0.0417

-0.107***

-0.0636**

(0.042)

(0.029)

(0.027)

-0.0217**

0.0150**

0.00405

(0.008)

(0.006)

(0.006)

-0.198

-0.0624

-0.219**

(0.178)

(0.108)

(0.103)

-1.155**

-0.671

(0.479)

(0.415)

-3.381***
(0.609)

cut2

-2.807***
(0.609)

cut3

-0.768
(0.610)

Constant

Year Effect

YES

YES

YES

Industry Effect

YES

YES

YES

Observations

10,725

8,100

8,100

R-squared

0.0601

0.28

0.279

Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This table provides regression results on the relation between management earnings forecast
quality and learning effects and peer effects.
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 10. The additional regression results of forecast quality
Additional Tests (First Performance Included)

MF_YEARS
PEER_PRECISION

Additional Tests (Precision Included)

Additional Tests (Both Included)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

PRECISION

ERROR

BIAS

ERROR

BIAS

ERROR

BIAS

0.139***

-0.0661***

-0.0224**

-0.0327***

-0.0189**

-0.0650***

-0.0219**

(0.012)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.010)

0.00984
(0.140)

PEER_ERROR

0.144**

0.149**

0.151**

(0.066)

(0.060)

(0.066)

PEER_BIAS

0.227***

0.234***

0.228***

(0.067)

(0.065)

(0.067)

Control Variables

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year Effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry Effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

10,528

4,081

4,081

8,100

8,100

4,081

4,081

R-squared

0.0846

0.352

0.367

0.288

0.281

0.358

0.368

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This table provides additional analysis on the relation between management earnings forecast quality and learning effects and peer effects. Columns
1-3 include firm’s first forecast quality in the baseline model; columns 4-5 include firm’s forecast precision in the baseline model; Columns 6-7
include both firm’s first forecast quality and firm’s forecast precision in the baseline model. See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 11. Endogeneity Test

MF_YEARS
PEER_PRECISION

(1)

(2)

(3)

PRECISION

ERROR

BIAS

0.0996***

-0.0333**

-0.0159**

(0.012)

(0.015)

(0.007)

0.101
(0.184)

PEER_ERROR

0.307**
(0.151)

PEER_BIAS

0.661**
(0.322)

cut1

-3.214***
(0.684)

cut2

-2.638***
(0.684)

cut3

-0.6
(0.685)

Constant

-1.824**

-0.901**

(0.789)

(0.439)

YES

YES

YES

-1.085***

4.027094***

1.031542***

(0.154)

(0.971)

(0.160)

0.0973***

-0.0064609

-0.002035

(0.004)

(0.006)

(0.002)

1.165***

2.440334

0.6141142

(0.017)

(1.009)

(0.164)

Year Effect

YES

YES

YES

Industry Effect

YES

YES

YES

10,602

7,538

2,825

0.092

0.252

Control Variables
First Stage
PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK
PEER_MF_YEARS
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Log likelihood

-12745.626

Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level lower than 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent (two-tail), respectively.
This table provides results from endogeneity tests. The endogenous variable is peer firms’
forecast quality in the past one year (PEER__PRECISION, PEER_ERROR and PEER_BIAS).
The instrument variable is the peer firms’ average idiosyncratic returns in the prior year
(PEER_EQUITY_SHOCK) and peer firms’ average forecasting performance in the past one year
(PEER_MF_YEARS).
See Appendix for variable definitions.
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